Two major events inform the perception of Ottoman rule both within our own area of concern, Bilad al-Sham and in the wider world. The first of these events was the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople (modern Istanbul) by Sultan Mehmet Fatih in 1453. For the first time in its eight hundred year history a Muslim state had taken over the spiritual home of orthodox Christianity and in the process become a major factor in European domestic politics.
The prestige accruing from this conquest firmly established the Ottomans as the principal Muslim power worldwide. The second event is the conquest of Egypt and Syria between 1515 and 1517 which also gave the Ottomans control of the Hijaz including both Mecca and Medina. The pre-eminent status of the Ottoman Sultan amongst Muslim rulers was now confirmed, as he adopted the role of protectors of the two shrines with the title of kh®dim alºaramayn al-Sharifayn 2 . Neither of these titles was held lightly and it can be seen that the Ottomans did their utmost to be seen as leaders of the Muslim world and defenders of Islam's holiest cities.
Of course this new status presented the Ottomans with new responsibilities which had not been encountered when they were a minor Turkish state. Three main challenges arose out of this situation; firstly they were now a global power with global alliances and enemies, 1. I am grateful to Bethany Walker and Pierre Bikai for inviting me to take part in this symposium.
2. E. Esin 1986 , « The Renovations effected, in the Ka'bah mosque, by the Ottoman Sultan Selim II (H.974-82/ 1566-74) » p. [225] [226] [227] [228] [229] [230] [231] [232] , La vie économique des provinces arabes et leurs sources documentaires à l'époque ottomane, t. III, Publications du Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Ottomanes, Morisques, de Documentation et d'Information (Zaghouan 1986) , 225-6. secondly they needed to maintain control over the vast territories which they had conquered and thirdly they needed to provide some sort of religious leadership.
In the following discussion I will examine how the fortification of the Hajj route from Damascus to Mecca relates to each of these issues. However before discussing these questions it is important to give a brief review of the process and nature of the fortifications 3 .
THE SEQUENCE OF FORTIFICATION (FIG.1) Although the Hajj from Cairo to Mecca (Darb al-ºajj al-Ma◊r¬) had been the principal concern of the Mamluks they also supported the Syrian ºajj route which was accorded almost equal status and had its own maΩmal 4 . However whilst the Egyptian overland route had been provided with fortresses and other facilities as early as the thirteenth century 5 the Syrian route had no forts with the possible exception of the castles of Jize (Ziza) and Qasr Shebib at Zerka 6 . Instead it appears that the Mamluk Hajj caravan from Damascus followed a route largely without facilities except for those provided at the few settlements on the way (e.g.
Bosra, Karak, and Tabuk).
Within a few years of the conquest (of Syria) the Ottoman Sultan Selim I had ordered the construction of fortresses at Sanamayn, Muzayrib and Tell Far'un (Mafraq) all within sixty kilometers of Damascus. By the 1570's the network was extended deep into the Hijaz with forts at Qatrana, 'Unaiza, Ma'an, Dhat al-Hajj, Tabuk, Ukhaidhir, al-'Ula and Hadiyya 7 .
The forts were of a standardized plan probably derived from medieval caravanserais 8 . There is also a more interesting possibility that they were derived from wooden forts used on The main difference is that most of the eighteenth century buildings have projecting corner turrets provided with narrow gun slits 11 . The other notable difference is that the later forts are even plainer than those of the sixteenth century thus there is no carved stone decoration above the doorways similar to that which can be seen at Ma'an and Qatrana. Anybody who has visited any of these forts can appreciate the massive effort required to build them in remote locations so far removed from the centres of power. In order to attempt to understand the mentality behind the construction of these forts I will return to the three questions addressed earlier:
How do these buildings fit into the Ottoman global policies?
How do these buildings relate to internal control (stability) of the empire?
How do these buildings relate to Ottoman ideas of religious leadership? OTTOMAN GLOBAL POLICY (FIG. 2) The Ottomans were relative newcomers to the area of Egypt and the Levant and as such they not only followed many of the policies of their Mamluk predecessors but also (Delhi, 1989) 156-7. claims to suzerainty over the political leaders of Mecca and Medina. Within this context the Hajj forts can be seen as part of a plan or process to secure Arabia from European, specifically Portuguese, attacks. As with the Hijaz railway nearly four hundred years later the fortification of the pilgrim route had definite military objectives 19 . If we look at Arabia as a whole in the sixteenth century it can be seen that it was divided into those areas under Portuguese domination (the coasts of south and south east Arabia) and the areas of Ottoman control (e.g. the Hijaz.
Basra and al-Hasa) with the area between controlled by Arab Bedouin tribes who were not, at this time, a military threat to the Ottomans (this situation was to change in the eighteenth century as will be discussed below). Whilst the Portuguese were obviously more suited to maritime warfare, the Ottomans had the advantage on land where they were generally welcomed as co-religionists and also had a better knowledge of the territory. This meant that the Red Sea and the Persian/Arabian Gulf were the most likely areas of conflict as they were accessible to both the Ottomans and the Portuguese. Plate 1. Qal'at Qatrana (sixteenth century) showing entrance set below three decorative stone balls, Also not arrow slits with decorative mouldings and domed machicolation above the gateway.
To the West, in Africa, the Ottomans built a series of larger forts which were intended to extend Ottoman power further south into the area of modern Sudan. Whilst the Portuguese appeared to be a significant threat in the first half of the sixteenth century by the later part of the same century a status quo had been established and there was even the prospect of a peace treaty between the two powers 27 . By the seventeenth century the Portuguese control of the Indian Ocean was being subverted by the English and the Dutch.
This situation may account for the lack of building activity on the Syrian Hajj route during the seventeenth century. In any case by this time Ottoman attention was more focused on south-eastern Europe.
INTERNAL CONTROL (Fig. 3) When the Ottomans took over control of Syria and Egypt in the early sixteenth century they were faced with the problem of establishing their rule over an essentially foreign people.
Whilst the Mamluk rulers were also largely non Arab they were at least more local and their system of government had evolved in Arab lands using Arabic as the language of government.
It was in this context that the Ottomans sought to consolidate their rule through military This in turn could have been a result of environmental factors such as drought.
However the fact that the attacks of the eighteenth century were successful may have been the result of another factor. The eighteenth century forts (Mudawwara, Fassu'a, Dab'a and Hassa) were built to a different design from their sixteenth century predecessors with projecting corner towers and small gun slits designed for hand held guns ( 
CONCLUSION
What should be clear from this brief discussion is that the Hajj forts had a variety of functions each of which served to increase Ottoman power in the region. Although they were relatively small structures their significance was increased by the isolation of their locations and the way they fitted into a wider network of fortresses in Palestine and beyond. The fact that the forts lack any overt religious symbolism either in terms of decoration or inscriptions suggests that their primary purpose was the extension of military power in the area. This is not to say that religious considerations were not important but that they were regarded as coincident to the interests of the state thus a document dated to 1584 refers to the Haram i Sherif in Mecca as 'necessary to state and religion' 49 . This hardly indicates passionate religious devotion rather it shows an awareness of the responsibilities of being the most powerful Muslim state and a desire to remain in control.
48. The Sultan and the state are often regarded as identical though as Richard van Leeuwen has pointed out in another context 'one should distinguish between the personal attitudes of the head of state and the policies of the large bureaucratic apparatus. A complete separation would not be adequate either, however, since if the sultan was not the personification of the state, he was at least its most overwhelming symbol, and in general something in between' Richard van Leeuwen, Waqfs and 
